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his is an engaging and closely reasoned essay on the 
role of intuition in analytic philosophy. Although 
Deutsch’s primary target is experimental philosophy (xphi), 
he argues that the myth of the intuitive has been around 
longer than xphi and that some of the myth’s most 
influential supporters (e.g. George Bealer, Laurence 
Bonjour, Alvin Goldman, Frank Jackson, and Joel Pust) are 
not experimental philosophers. One of the virtues of this 
book is Deutsch’s effort to treat xphi fairly by 
T 
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distinguishing different uses of experimental methods and 
giving credit where he thinks credit is due. His criticism of 
xphi focuses on what he calls “negative xphi.” According 
to Deutsch, negative xphi collects data on people’s 
intuitions and how they vary from group to group in order 
to: “call certain traditional philosophical arguments into 
question and, most importantly, to raise a worry about the 
epistemic value of the philosophical intuitions negative 
xphiles take to be involved in those arguments.” (pp. 1-2) 
He maintains that the flaw in this project is its false 
assumption that traditional philosophical arguments depend 
on intuitions as evidence. Although I have deep reserve-
ations about some of Deutsch’s conclusions, I believe his 
argument helps to illuminate the methodological clash 
between partisans of the armchair and practitioners of xphi. 
 
 Early in the book Deutsch draws a distinction between two 
ways of understanding the claim that intuitions count as 
evidence for philosophical arguments: 
 
(EC1) Many philosophical arguments treat 
the fact that certain contents are intuitive as 
evidence for those very contents. 
 
(EC2) Many philosophical arguments treat 
the contents of certain intuitions as evidence 
for or against other contents (e.g. the 
contents of more general principles.) (p. 36) 
 
Deutsch believes that EC2 is true and EC1 is false. He 
asserts that “we see confirmation of EC2 in nearly every 
case in which a philosopher constructs a counterexample to a 
generalization or theory” (p. 37), but, outside of 
metaphilosophy, rarely see philosophers appealing to the fact 
that an intuition that p is an intuition as evidence that p is 
true. He contends that in first-order philosophy (as opposed 
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to metaphilosophy) philosophers appeal to the justifiability 
of some of the propositions we intuit rather than to the fact 
that that they are intuitions. In other words, it is the content 
of an intuition that matters, not its state as intuition.    
 
As Deutsch correctly observes, analytic philosophers do not 
agree on how the term ‘intuition’ should be used. Some 
insist on distinguishing characteristics like being 
spontaneous, non-perceptual, or non-inferential. Bealer, for 
example, defines intuitions as intellectual seemings and, in 
Deutsch’s words, “thinks that philosophical intuitions 
present their contents as necessarily true.” (27). Others just 
equate intuitions with judgments, beliefs, or dispositions to 
believe. Deutsch embraces a “no-theory theory of 
intuitions.” Rather than characterizing intuitions or 
intuitiveness in advance, he takes instances of judgment 
that philosophers have called or treated as intuitions and 
tries to assess their evidential import for philosophical 
theorizing. While this seems to me a reasonable strategy, I 
suspect that his reliance on the term ‘intuitiveness’ 
compromises his consistency in sticking to it. 
‘Intuitiveness’ can be used to mark the likelihood of a 
particular belief or judgment (e.g. “it isn’t knowledge”) 
arising when people consider a given case (e.g. a Getteir 
case), but it can also be used to refer to an epistemic 
property of a belief or judgment. I think he lets the latter 
bleed into the former. I try to be more consistent in this 
review by avoiding ‘intuitiveness’ except to quote Deutsch 
and by using ‘intuition’ interchangeably with ‘judgment’—
leaving open the question of whether a given 
intuition/judgment is spontaneous or non-spontaneous, 
inferential or non-inferential, reliable or non-reliable, etc. 
 
Deutsch builds his case against negative xphi and the myth 
of the intuitive by a close examination of some well-known 
thought experiments that philosophers have proposed to 
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challenge various definitions, theories and principles. He 
discusses at length Gettier’s counterexamples to the 
definition of knowledge as justified true belief and Kripke’s 
“Kurt Gödel” counterexample to descriptivist theories of 
reference for proper names. He examines more briefly 
Frankfurt’s counterexample to the principle of alternative 
possibilities (PAP) and several other counterexamples as 
well. He considers both the explicit wording of these 
thought experiments and, what he takes to be, their implicit 
methodology. For the sake of economy, I concentrate 
below view on Gettier, Kripke, and Frankfurt. 
 
A well-drawn thought experiment is effective when it elicit 
the intuition it was designed to elicit, but much the same 
may be said of well-drawn optical illusions Why trust that 
the elicited intuition is true? Deutsch’s thesis is that the 
evidence for its truth comes from reasons and arguments 
suggested by their proposers and defenders. He contrasts 
his thesis with Timothy Williamson’s view that no 
evidence is required beyond the believability of the 
contents of the intuition. He also contrasts his thesis with, 
what he takes to be, the commitment of negative xphi to 
count as evidence how many or what groups of people have 
the intuition.  
 
In support of his thesis he points out that Gettier, Kripke, 
and Frankfurt all give arguments for accepting the truth of 
the intuitions their thought experiments are designed to 
elicit and that subsequent defenders add arguments of their 
own. Gettier’s arguments are very brief, but, then, so is the 
paper in which they appear. Both of his thought 
experiments are designed to elicit the intuition that a 
particular instance of belief, though justified and true, is not 
knowledge. In the Ten Coins Case, Gettier gives the 
following argument for concluding that proposition (e) 
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“Smith knows that the man who will get the job has ten 
coins in his pocket” is false.  
 
But it is equally clear that Smith does not 
know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue 
of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, 
while Smith does not know how many coins 
are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in 
(e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, 
whom he falsely believes to be the man who 
will get the job. (p. 122) 
 
In the Brown in Barcelona Case, Gettier gives the 
following argument for concluding that proposition (h) 
“Smith knows Jones owns a Ford or Brown in Barcelona” 
is false.  
 
But imagine now that two further cond-
itions.  First Jones does not own a Ford, but 
is at present driving a rented car.  And 
secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and 
entirely unknown to Smith, the place 
mentioned in proposition (h) happens really 
to be the place where Brown is. If these two 
conditions hold, then Smith does not know 
that (h) is true. . .  (p. 123)  
 
Deutsch then goes on to say:   
 
The presence of these arguments shows that 
the idea that Gettier relies only on intuition 
in support of his judgments about his cases 
is a myth, a piece of philosophical folklore. . 
. . But an examination of the paper reveals 
that Gettier does not anywhere appeal to 
intuitions or the intuitiveness of the judg-
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ments he makes about his cases. He relies 
instead on arguments. (p. 83) 
 
Although Deutsch is correct in saying that Gettier does not 
mention intuitions or intuitiveness, he cannot say the same 
about Kripke. Early in Naming and Necessity (1980) 
Kripke declares: 
 
Of course, some philosophers think that 
something’s having intuitive content is very 
inconclusive evidence in favor it. I think it’s 
very heavy evidence in favor of anything 
myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what 
more conclusive evidence one can have 
about anything, ultimately speaking. (p. 42) 
 
Deutsch claims that it is a mistake to read this passage as an 
endorsement of intuitions per se as evidence. He argues 
that the subject here is the distinction between essential and 
accidental properties and that “all that Kripke means by the 
claim that the distinction ‘has intuitive content’ ” is that 
ordinary people draw the distinction. (p. 105) Although I 
find this reading implausibly narrow, I concede there is 
room to debate how Kripke understood his remark about 
the evidential primacy of intuitions to apply to the Gödel 
Case. So let’s put that remark aside and examine his 
presentation of the Gödel Case. This case is intended to 
counter semantic theories that claim that the person to 
whom a personal name refers is determined by descriptions 
associated with that name. This case is designed to elicit 
the intuition that even under the bizarre conditions 
specified, the name ‘Gödel’ still refers to Gödel, who does 
not fit the operative description, rather than to Schmidt, 
who does fit the operative description. Here is how it goes. 
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Kripke asks us to imagine that the mathematician Kurt 
Gödel did not in fact discover the incompleteness of 
arithmetic. He asks us to imagine: “A man named 
‘Schmidt’ whose body was found in Vienna under 
mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the 
work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of 
the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel.” 
(p. 84) The example is clever because most people, if they 
have heard of Gödel at all, have only heard about him as 
the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. 
So a descriptivist account of what ‘Gödel’ refers to might 
plausibly be reduced to: ‘the man who discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic.’ (This is what I have called 
the operative description.) Kripke then says the following: 
 
On the [descriptivist] view in question, then, 
when our ordinary man uses the name 
‘Gödel,’ he really means to refer to Schmidt, 
because Schmidt is the unique person 
satisfying the description ‘the man who 
discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.’ 
. . . So, since the man who discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact 
Schmidt, we, when we talk about ‘Gödel,’ 
are in fact always referring to Schmidt.  But it 
seems to me that we are not are not. We 
simply are not. (p. 84) 
 
Although the last sentence of this quote suggests that 
Kripke is appealing to brute intuition, he also offers an 
argument in a footnote. After sketching the fictional Gödel 
example, he gives some real-life examples of people using 
a name “on the basis of considerable misinformation.” (p. 
84) Some people believe that Peano discovered the so-
called Peano axioms, though in fact it was Dedekind. Some 
people believe that Einstein invented the atomic bomb, and 
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some believe that Columbus was the first man to realize 
that the Earth is round. A descriptivist theory implies that 
when people who are misinformed in these ways use the 
names ‘Peano,’ ‘Einstein,’ or ‘Columbus,’ they are 
referring to the individuals who actually accomplished 
these things. “But they don’t,” insists Kripke. He adds in a 
footnote that if they were to say: “Peano discovered 
Peano’s Axioms” or “Einstein invented the atomic bomb” 
or “Columbus was the first man to realize the Earth is 
round,” their statements would be false, not trivially true. 
(p. 85n) This is where Deutsch locates the evidence for the 
evidence and anchors his brief against x-phi challenges to 
Kripke’s interpretation of the Gödel case.   
 
In 2004, 24 years after the publication of Naming and 
Necessity, Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, 
and Stephen Stich published the results of their 
experimental research on the Gödel case under the title: 
“Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style.” The subjects of the 
experiment were 82 undergraduate, 40 culturally Western 
students at Rutgers University and 42 culturally Chinese 
students at the University of Hong Kong. These students 
were asked to respond to four (verbal) probes modeled on 
examples from Naming and Necessity. Two of the probes 
were modeled on the Gödel/Schmidt thought experiment. 
One uses some of Kripke’s own wording of the 
Gödel/Schmidt story, and the other uses a parallel story 
about the Chinese astronomer Tsu Ch’ung Chih who is 
famous in China for having discovering the precise times of 
the summer and winter solstices. The former probe 
describes a speaker named John who learned in college that 
Gödel was the man who proved the incompleteness 
arithmetic and has never heard anything else about Gödel. 
It also asserts that, unbeknownst to John, Schmidt really 
discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, though Gödel 
got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work. 
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Finally, it asks the participant to answer the following 
question: “When John uses the name ‘Gödel’ he is talking 
about: (A) The person who really discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic? (B) The person who got hold 
of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work?” The 
latter probe asks a parallel question about Tsu Ch’ung 
Chih, substituting the discovery of the solstices for the 
discovery of arithmetic’s incompleteness. 
 
The Western students picked B answers, the causal-
historical answers, nearly twice as often as the Chinese 
students:1.13/.63. Machery et. al. interpret this result as 
bearing out their prediction that, in light of earlier studies 
on East-West cultural differences, Westerners would be 
more likely than Chinese to have intuitions that fall in line 
with non-descriptivist (i.e. causal-historical) theories of 
reference. “Thus,” they say, “the evidence suggests that it is 
wrong for philosophers to assume a priori the universality 
of their own semantic intuitions.” (p. 53) They conclude the 
article with a sweeping admonition:    
 
Since the intuitions philosophers pronounce 
from their armchairs are likely to be a 
product of their own culture and their 
academic training, in order to determine the 
implicit theories that underlie the use of 
names across cultures, philosophers need to 
get out of their armchairs. (p. 54)   
 
Subsequent experimental studies of Gödel-type cases have 
yielded somewhat different results, but the methodological 
issues remain the same. Deutsch vents his frustration with 
those who think that essential evidence for a theory of 
references resides in how many or which sorts of people 
have intuitions consonant with that theory. He says: 
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The view that it is simply an intuition about 
the Gödel Case that is the engine driving 
Kripke’s view of the case is a bad mistake. 
A worse mistake is thinking that the cross-
cultural variability about the case, or ones 
similar to it, presents a significant challenge 
either to Kripke’s judgment about the case 
or to the methods he uses in arriving at it. 
Instead, the judgment stands or falls with the 
quality of the arguments marshaled in its 
defense. The worst mistake is to think, as 
Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich put it 
in their most recent paper [2012], that 
Kripke and other philosophers of language 
think that “the correct method for 
determining the right theory of reference” is 
“by appeal to the intuitions of competent 
speakers about the reference of proper 
names (or other kinds of words) in actual 
and possible cases.” . . . No. This is just 
plain wrong. (p. 111) 
 
Deutsch gives less attention to Frankfurt’s equally famous 
thought experiment concerning moral responsibility, but he 
draws the same methodological conclusions. In “Alternate 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969) Frankfurt 
challenges the principle that a person is morally responsible 
for an action only if that person could have done otherwise 
(PAP) by presenting variations on a thought experiment 
designed to elicit the intuition that: “since Jones is acting 
solely from reasons of his own, the fact that Black ensures 
he cannot act otherwise does not excuse him from moral 
responsibility.” Yet Deutsch denies that Frankfurt is 
thinking in terms of intuitions or intuitiveness at all. He 
states:  
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You were asked earlier to accept that the 
answer is: the intuitiveness of the claim. But 
this not the answer that Frankfurt actually 
gives, and there is no reason to think that it 
is implicit in Frankfurt’s discussion. (He 
does not use the term “intuition” or its 
cognates, for example.) (p. xv) 
 
In fact this denial conflicts with Frankfurt’s own words. 
Near the beginning of the essay Frankfurt says, “I propose 
to develop some examples . . . and to suggest that our moral 
intuitions concerning these examples tend to disconfirm the 
principle of alternate possibilities.” (p. 830) 
 
Although Deutsch is mistaken about Frankfurt’s use of the 
term ‘intuition,’ Frankfurt’s does indeed give an argument 
for the intuition his case is designed to elicit. The common 
denominator of Frankfurt’s variations is a counterfactual 
intervener (Black) who guarantees that a person (Jones) 
could not do otherwise but in fact plays no role in bringing 
about that person’s action, since the person (Jones), acts 
solely for reasons of his own. His argument is: 
 
It would be quite unreasonable to excuse 
Jones for his action or to withhold the praise 
to which it would normally entitle him, on 
the basis of the fact that he could not do 
otherwise. This fact played no role at all in 
leading him to act as he did. He would have 
acted the same even if it had not been a fact. 
Indeed, everything happened just as it would 
have happened without Black’s presence in 
the situation and without his readiness to 
intrude into it. (p. 836) 
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He adds in a footnote that the role played by Black could be 
played by “natural forces involving no will or design at 
all.” (p. 836n) Again Deutsch stresses that what is going on 
here is not merely the eliciting of the intuition “since Jones 
is acting solely from reasons of his own, the fact that Black 
ensures he cannot act otherwise does not excuse him from 
moral responsibility.” Frankfurt, he claims, gives evidence 
for the truth of that intuition (“evidence-for-the-evidence”) 
by pointing out that Jones’s inability to do otherwise 
“played no role at all in leading him to act as he did” and 
then “evidence-for-the-evidence-for-the-evidence” by 
pointing out “everything happened just as it would have 
happened without Black’s presence in the situation and 
without his readiness to intrude into it.”    
 
 Toward the end of The Myth of the Intuitive Deutsch 
consider several replies to x-phi that differ from his 
primacy of arguments thesis. Two are especially 
interesting. The “expertise reply” takes x-phi to task for 
gathering data on folk intuitions (the intuitions of ordinary 
people) rather on what really counts: the intuitions of 
philosophers. Deutsch agrees that the judgments of 
philosophers are likely to be better than the judgments of 
non-philosophers, but not because philosophers are better 
intuiters. “They are better,” he says, “because philosophers 
are better than nonphilosophers at arguing for, and 
defending, philosophical judgments.” (p. 141) The 
“multiple concepts reply” suggests that diversity among 
intuitions in response to thought experiments may be the 
result of different people drawing on different concepts—
say, of knowledge—and, therefore, disagreements between 
them of whether x is an instance of knowledge are apparent 
rather than real. Here Deutsch sides with x-phi: the burden 
of proof is on the proponents of multiple concepts.  
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Deutsch’s main thesis is refreshingly direct, but is it sound? 
“Philosophy,” he says, “simply does not rely evidentially 
on intuitions or what is intuitive. Instead philosophers 
argue for their judgments about cases, and the cogency of 
these arguments is independent of who intuits them.” (p. 
155) My principal reservations about Deutsch’s thesis and 
the arguments he musters in its favor are given below.  
 
I doubt that the arguments he attributes to Gettier, Kripke, 
and Frankfurt for the truth of the intuitions elicited by their 
cases are clearly distinguishable from the cases themselves 
and therefore constitutes “evidence for the evidence.” When, 
Gettier argues for the conclusion that Smith doesn’t know 
(e) (“The man who will get the job has ten coins his 
pocket”), he restates what he has already stipulated to be true 
in this case: 1) “(e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in 
Smith's pocket”; 2) “Smith does not know how many coins 
are in Smith's pocket”; 3) Smith “bases his belief in (e) on a 
count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely 
believes to be the man who will get the job.” (p. 122) His 
argument in the Brown in Barcelona Case doesn’t even 
bother to restate the conditions he has stipulated. Right after 
stipulating that Jones doesn’t own a Ford and that Brown is 
in Barcelona, he says: “If these two conditions hold, then 
Smith does not know that (h) [“Either Jones owns a Ford, or 
Brown is in Barcelona”] is true, even though (i) (h) is true, 
(ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is 
justified in believing that (h) is true.” (p. 123) Well, of 
course, the two conditions hold, since Gettier has stipulated 
that they hold, just as he stipulated earlier “that Smith has 
strong evidence . . . that Jones owns a Ford.” The question in 
whether Gettier’s conclusion that Smith does not know (h) 
follows from these stipulated conditions.    
 
Deutsch locates Kripke’s argument for the Gödel Case is 
his reasoning that in a real-life case like the undeservedly 
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accredited Peano, a descriptivist theory of reference would 
entail that if someone who had no association with Peano 
except the false belief that Peano discovered Peano’s 
axioms were to say: “Peano discovered Peano’s axioms,” 
then she would be saying something trivially true rather 
than false. This is a distinct argument, but it is not a distinct 
argument for the truth of the intuition elicited by the Gödel 
Case. That intuition is that the person being referred to by 
‘Gödel’ is still Gödel rather than Schmidt. His argument for 
that intuition is just the end of the case itself: “So, since the 
man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in 
fact Schmidt, we, when talk about ‘Gödel,’ are in fact 
always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are 
not are not. We simply are not.” (p. 84) The argument that 
Deutsch alludes to is an argument about how we ought to 
use proper names for purposes of referring rather than an 
argument about what we actually do.  
 
The premises in Frankfurt’s argument for the truth of the 
intuition that “since Jones is acting solely from reasons of 
his own, the fact that Black ensures he cannot act 
otherwise does not excuse him from moral responsibility” 
makes explicit what is already implicit in the case itself. 
Frankfurt has already specified that: “Jones for reasons of 
his own decides to perform and does perform the very 
action that Black wants him to perform” and “Black never 
has to show his hand because Jones for reasons of his 
own, decides to perform and does perform the very action 
Black wants him to perform.” His argument then 
highlights the significance of these givens by pointing out 
that the fact Jones could not do otherwise “played no role 
at all in leading to him to act as he did” and that 
“everything happened just as it would have happened 
without Black’s presence in the situation and without his 
readiness to intrude into it.” In subsequent passages he 
restates these points using still other words. Restatement 
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of this kind is a legitimate way to clarify and emphasize, 
but I doubt that it constitutes “evidence for the evidence.”  
 
Second, the arguments Deutsch hails as “evidence for the 
evidence” are logically incomplete. They are enthymemes. 
In order to be valid and they require additional premise. In 
the Gettier cases the missing premise could be a principle 
of the form: “a justified true belief x is knowledge only if it 
satisfies condition c.” In the Gödel Case, the premise could 
be: “Whenever we use a personal name n to refer to 
someone and that name has been passed down to us 
through a causal-historical process that originated in the 
bestowal of that name on an individual person, i, then n 
refers to i.” In Frankfurt’s case the premise could be: 
“whenever a person acts solely from reasons of his own, 
the fact he cannot act otherwise does not excuse him from 
moral responsibility.” 
 
Of course, such premises have to be argued for, not just 
stipulated, and attempts to do so have failed to produce 
unanimity. Epistemologists have quarreled for fifty years 
over what condition c might be. Philosophers of language 
differ on when and whether the reference of a personal 
name depends on the sentence in which that name occurs. 
Parties to the free will controversy debate the meaning and 
possibility of acting “solely from reasons of one’s own,” 
especially if the role of counterfactual intervener is played 
by natural forces. Whatever the reasons for the absence of 
such premises, their absence has not detracted from the 
enduring interest generated by the cases themselves. 
Indeed, I suspect that these cases continue to be fascinating 
precisely because they elicit striking intuitions without 
tying down those intuitions to premises that would have to 
endure the gauntlet of philosophical scrutiny and criticism. 
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Third, I take the regress problem seriously. Deutsch, to his 
credit, does so as well. He says:  
 
[T]he idea is that, ultimately, if any 
conclusions we reach via argument are to be 
properly grounded in evidence or justified at 
all, then there must be some point in the 
chain of premises, and premises for the 
premises, and so on, at which we reach 
propositions that qualify as evidence but are 
not arrived at via inference from still further 
premises. This evidential “rock bottom” 
need not be the premises that a philosopher . 
. . takes as a starting point in arguing for 
some conclusion in a paper or book, but the 
thought is that rock bottom evidence must 
nevertheless be there, waiting in the wings 
as it were: otherwise there is no, and cannot 
be any, inferential evidence for anything. 
(pp. 124-125) 
 
Despite his acknowledgement that the regress problem 
needs to be taken seriously, he offers several reasons for 
thinking that it does not compromise his critique of 
negative x-phi. 
 
To begin with, he points out that negative x-phi focuses on 
the use of intuitions as evidence at a stage (e.g. in thought 
experiments and cases) that is far above rock bottom and 
repeats his allegation that it misinterprets the evidential role 
they actually play. He also claims: “the regress problem 
concerns inferential justification in general. It is not a 
special problem for philosophy or its methods.” (p. 126) 
Science, he argues, is no better off than philosophy when it 
comes to epistemic foundations: “Is there any evidence or 
argument that would suggest that rock bottom scientific 
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evidence is, or would be, universally agreed on, or that 
judgments about such evidence would not vary with 
truth-irrelevant factors?” (p. 126) He notes, moreover, that 
if coherentism is true, “[s]ome premises are justified not by 
inference from further premises but instead by their 
coherence with other premises.” (p. 127) 
 
I am not persuaded. Deutsch conflates the problem of 
grounding premises in evidence with the problem of rock 
bottom foundations and blurs important differences 
between philosophy and the sciences. The sciences seek to 
solve problems by finding data that will help to confirm or 
disconfirm a given hypothesis or decide between 
alternative hypotheses. They count data as evidentially 
significant when the data indicate that one hypothesis is 
better than another (or the null hypothesis) at making 
predictions. Methodological safeguards such as 
repeatability of experimental data and the use of control 
groups diminish, though they do not eliminate, the 
influence of truth-irrelevant factors. By these means 
scientists have been able to reach provisional agreement on 
solutions to many of their problems. Scientists qua 
scientists do not address the problem of rock bottom 
foundations: they leave that to philosophers.  
 
Unfortunately, philosophers have not been able to reach 
agreement—provisional or otherwise—on the solution to 
the foundations problem, nor, for that matter, on any other 
central philosophical problem. Nevertheless, they seek to 
show that some solutions are better others. One of the ways 
they seek to do this is by appealing to intuitions, and yet 
they are curiously unsystematic about this practice. They 
don’t agree on what intuitions are or why they count as 
evidence. They don’t specify the credentials of intuiters 
whose intuitions deserved to be counted or tally the 
frequency of favorable and unfavorable intuitions among 
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members of that population. Deutsch suggests that this lack 
of rigor doesn’t matter because intuitions per se are not 
evidence: they are judgments that need to be argued for. 
Experimental philosophers, by contrast, take at face value 
the philosophical practice of treating intuitions as evidence 
and put that practice to the test by imposing on it the rigor 
of data-gathering standards in cognitive psychology. 
 
All roads lead back to the same question: Can an intuition 
“that p” be evidence that p is true? I think the correct 
answer is: sometimes. Consider the cases discussed above. 
Each of Gettier’s cases is intended to elicit the intuition that 
a particular instance of belief, though justified and true, is 
not knowledge. Deutsch dismisses the relevance of the 
cross-cultural study “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” 
that Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich 
published in 2001. This groundbreaking study found that a 
majority of Western subjects had epistemic intuitions 
consistent with Gettier’s attempt to refute JTB, while a 
majority of Asian subjects did not. Weinberg et. al. argue 
that if their subject groups are representative, “it seems that 
what counts as knowledge on the banks of the Ganges may 
does not count as knowledge on the banks of the 
Mississippi!” (p. xiv) Deutsch counters: “If anything is 
clear in this area, it is that, if agents in Gettier cases lack 
knowledge that is a matter that does not depend on which 
river’s bank one stands upon.” (p. xiv) 
 
Under what conditions would Deutsch be right?  He would 
be right, I think, if knowledge were a natural kind. The 
truth of the intuition that diamonds are carbon does not 
vary from culture to culture, even if the frequency of that 
intuition does. We can be confident of this—until further 
notice from the community of chemists—because there is 
virtual unanimity among chemists that carbon is a chemical 
element (an atom with six protons) that can take a variety 
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of forms and that diamond crystals are one such form. 
Philosophers, however, have not been able to agree on a 
definition or theory of knowledge, so there is room to 
debate whether and in what respects knowledge is a 
cultural rather than a natural kind. If knowledge is, at least 
in part, a cultural kind, then the frequency of certain 
epistemic intuitions in a given culture may be relevant to 
what knowledge is. 
 
Can an intuition “that p” be evidence that p is true, where p 
is a proposition about how a word is used to refer? Kripke 
presents the Gödel Case to illustrate, what he believes to 
be, a fact (not a necessary truth) about the use of personal 
names by ordinary people. He concedes that one could 
commit in the privacy of one’s room to use a personal 
name in the descriptivist way but adds that: “In general our 
reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but 
on other people in the community, the history of how the 
name reached one, and things like that.” (p. 95) Note that 
the fact Kirpke is trying to establish is akin the facts sought 
by lexicographers. Lexicographers gather data on how 
competent speakers in a language community use words to 
talk about the world with other members of that 
community. I doubt that their data-gathering methods 
include eliciting intuitions by thought experiments, but they 
assume that what a word means is inseparable from the 
intuitions of competent speakers about its sense and 
reference. We would laugh at a dictionary entry that said 
this word means X, though competent speakers don’t use it 
that way. Therefore, unlike Deutsch, I see no reason why 
x-phi studies “that appeal to the intuitions of competent 
speakers about the reference of proper names” (p. 111) 
cannot be relevant to an assessment of Kripke’s view. 
 
The intuitions at issue in Frankfurt’s case are, as Frankfurt 
acknowledges, moral intuitions. Specifically, they are 
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judgments of moral responsibility, blameworthiness, and 
praiseworthiness. Can an intuition “that p” be evidence that 
p is true, where p is a proposition that a person is morally 
responsible and blameworthy for an action? If being morally 
responsible and blameworthy are inseparable from being 
judged or held responsible and blameworthy, if they are 
grounded, as Hume might say, in affections of 
disapprobation within human breasts, then the answer is yes.  
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